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Respondent 1 Cross-Appellant Wilma Claire Justad (hereinafter "Justad"), submits this
Reply Brief in response to the arguments set forth by Appellant 1 Cross-Respondent Ronald
Ward (hereinafter "Ward"), in his Appellant I Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief ("Ward's Reply
Brief") filed in this matter.

For the reasons set forth below, Ward does not present any

compelling or justifiable reason for this Court to grant Ward the relief he seeks on appeal.
I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Justad realleges and incorporates herein the Statement of the Case, Course of
Proceedings, and Statement of Facts set forth in her opening brief. (Justad's Respondent's /
Cross Appellant's Brief, pp.l-6).
11.

A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of review.
In her opening brief, Justad set forth the standard of review arising in an appeal to this

Court from a district court's decision to specifically enforce an option contract. (Justad's
Respondent's / Cross Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7). Briefly stated, the decision to grant specific
performance is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court. Kessler v. Tortoise
Development, Inc., 134 Idaho 264, 270, 1 P.3d 292, 298 (2000). As such, a district court's
decision to grant or deny parties' request for specific performance will not be overturned on
appeal short of a showing that the district court abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion
review requires a three-part inquiry: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho 24, 28, 175 P.3d 186,
190 (2007). The burden is on the appealing party to establish that the district court abused its
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discretion. See Zimmerman v. Volkswagen ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857,920 P.2d 67,73
(1996) ("holding, [tlhe burden is on the party opposing the award to demonstrate an abuse of the
district court's discretion").
As was shown in Justad's opening brief, Ward has failed to cany the above-mentioned
burden on this appeal. Ward has not set forth any argument that the district court failed to
perceive the issue of whether to grant or deny specific performance in this case as one of
discretion. Furthermore, Ward has failed to establish that the court acted outside the boundaries
of its discretion, or that it failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason. As a result, the
district court's decision to specifically enforce the option contract should be affirmed on appeal.
B.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the option contract
contained sufficiently complete material terms so as to be valid and specifically
enforceable.
In its bench ruling, the district court held that the option contract was sufficiently

complete, definite, and certain in all its material terms to be enforceable through a decree of
specific performance. (Tr., p.111, 11.18-19). As in his Appellant's Brief, Ward continues to
argue in his Reply Brief that option agreement is unenforceable because it lacks certain essential
terms. (Ward's Reply Brief, pp.2-4). Specifically, Ward argues that option contract at issue
here is insufficient with respect to the following two terms: (1) manner of payment, and (2)
method of conveying title to the real property. (Ward's Reply Brief, pp.2-4). Ward's arguments
in these respects are unavailing, and each will be addressed in turn.
1.

The option contract is sufficiently definite with regard to the manner of
payment term so as to be valid and specifically enforceable.
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In Dante v. Colas, 121 Idaho 149, 152, 823 P.2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1993), the Idaho
Court of Appeals held that for an option to be specifically enforceable, it must "be certain as to
price, manner of payment, and description of the property." Other jurisdictions have similarly
held that to be enforceable, an option contract must contain the following: (1) an agreement
conferring a right to buy; (2) certain described property; (3) a fixed period of time; and (4) a
stated price. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser

5 28 (2006); see e.g., Tachdjian v. Phillips,

568 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Ga. App. 2002). In this case, as set forth in more detail in Justad's opening
briefing, the option contract at issue contained all the terms required under Idaho law to he valid
specifically enforceable. (Justad's Respondent's I Cross Appellant's Brief, pp.9-13).
Nonetheless, Ward argues that the option contract lacks a manner of payment term, and
should be unenforceable as a result. (Ward's Reply Brief, pp.2-3).

In support of his argument,

Ward simply argues that district court's holding that the first $9,700 payment was to be due on
the date of exercise - April 11, 2006

-

to be followed by equal annual payments until the

purchase price was paid off, "converted the parties' ten-year contract to a nine-year contract."
(Ward's Reply Brief, pp.2-3). Simply stated, Ward's argument in this respect lacks merit.
This Court has held, that with respect to the specific performance of real estate contracts,
specific performance will not be granted unless the contract is "complete, definite and certain in
all of its material terms, or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced
to certainty." Locklear v. Tucker, 69 Idaho 84,90,203 P.2d 380,383-84 (1949). However, this
Court does hold the contracting parties to a standard of absolute certainty relative to every detail
of an option contract, and "uncertainty in a subsidiary part of an [option] agreement whose main
particulars are sufficiently certain, will not prevent a decree of specific performance." Id.
(emphasis added).
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In this case, the manner of payment term provided for in the option contract is certain,
and in the alternative, is easily capable of being reduced to certainty. The option contract in this
case expressly stated the manner of payment, providing that the purchase price of $97,000 "shall
be payable in equal annual installments from the date of exercise of said Option over a ten (10)
year period of time, without interest upon the unpaid balance." (Plaintiffs Ex. 3); (R., p.114).
The plain language of the option contract, if not certain, can be reduced to certainty. The district
court easily reduced the manner of payment term to certainty in its bench holding:
I am finding . . . that the option was exercised as of April 11, 2006. The first
annual payment was due at that time, and that's consistent with what [Justad]
testified her expectation of the first payment being due, and that was when the
option was exercised, so the contract tells us that the first payment's due when the
option's exercised.

I find as a matter of fact and law that $9,700 was due on April 1lth, 2006, another
$9,700 was due April 1lth, 2007, and another $9,700 is due April 1 lth 2008 and
so on. Now, those payments have not been made, and the reason they've not been
made is this litigation and essentially Ron Ward's refusal to recognize [Justad's]
acceptance of the option.
The district court found, and that option contract clearly contemplated, that the purchase price of
$97,000 would be paid in ten (10) installment payments, to be made annually, the first of which
was due "on the date of exercise." There is nothing so uncertain with respect to this term to
cause the option contract to be unenforceable.
In even more extreme situations, where the price of purchase and the terms of payment of
an option contract are not specified in the contract itself, option contracts have been specifically
enforced where the price and manner of payment could otherwise be reduced to certainty. See

e.g., Dante, 121 Idaho at 152, 823 P.2d at 186 (in affirming the enforceability of a lease-option,
the court held "the price of the purchase and terms of payment, though not specified, could easily
have been reduced to certainty"). Thus, Ward's argument that the option contract should be
RESPONDENT'S 1 CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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unenforceable and invalid because it is insufficient with respect to the manner of payment term is
unavailing.
2.

The option contract contained all the terms required to be valid and
enforceable.

In addition, Ward argues in his Reply Brief that the option contract should be found
unenforceable because it does not specify "the method of conveying title to the real property."
(Ward's Reply Brief, pp.3-4). Ward's premise is erroneous as a matter of law. As an initial
matter, Ward does not cite to any case law or authority from any jurisdiction wherein it has been
held that the method of conveying title to the real property is one of the essential terms necessary
to the specific enforcement of an option contract, the lack of which would render an otherwise
valid option contract unenforceable.
To the contrary, it has been held in Idaho that for an option to be specifically enforceable,
it must "be certain as to price, manner of payment, and description of the property." Dante, 121
Idaho at 152, 823 P.2d at 186. The option contract at issue here, as established in detail in
Justad's opening briefing, contained all the terms required under Idaho law to be valid and
enforceable. (Justad's Respondent's I Cross Appellant's Brief, pp.9-13).

Similarly, as stated

above, other jurisdictions have stated that an option contract will be enforceable if it contains the
following terms: ( I ) an agreement conferring a right to buy; (2) certain described property; (3) a
fixed period of time: and (4) a stated price. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser

5 28 (2006);

see e.g., Tachdjian v. Phillips, 568 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Ga. App. 2002). Ward has not cited any
authority that requires "the method of conveying title to the real property" as a precondition to
the specific enforcement of an option contract.
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Rather, in support of his argument, Ward relies upon this Court's opinion in Hoffman v. S

V Go., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 628 P.2d 218 (1981), a case which is not on point with the facts of
this case, and which does not involve an option contract or the specific enforcement of an option
contract. In Hoffman, the plaintifflappellant brought an action seeking specific performance or
damages based upon the defendantlrespondent's refusal to convey real property pursuant to an
alleged oral contract. 102 Idaho at 188, 628 P.2d at 219. The issue in that case was whether
sufficient memoranda existed evidencing the alleged oral agreement to adequately comply with
the statute of frauds. Id. at 190, 628 P.2d at 221. The court held there was not, stating in
relevant part:
The letter does not sufficielitly set forth the credit terms of the oral agreement
between the parties. This does not mean that the oral agreement is incomplete,
but only that the written evidence of that agreement is insufjcient to satisfi the
statute of frauds The memorandum which evidences the verbal agreement must
contain all the terms of that agreement. Otherwise, it cannot be enforced at law or
in equity
Id. at 191, 628 P.2d at 222 (emphasis added). Of significance, the Court expressly held that the
lack of credit terms did not mean that the parties' oral agreement was incomplete, but only that it
failed to satisfy the statute of frauds. Id. In this case, the statute of Erauds is not at issue, and
thus, Ward's reliance on Hoffman is misplaced,
C.

Idaho law recognizes that in every contract there exists not only express terms, but
also those implied terms which are necessary to effectuate the intent of the parties.
In his Reply Brief, Ward sets forth argument that the district court abused its discretion

by implying a contract for deed transaction with respect to the option contract. (Ward's Reply
Brief, pp.4-5). With respect to the finding of implied terms in a contract, this Court made clear
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that there exist both express and implied terms in a contract, and that implied terms are as much
a part of the contract as express terms:
In every contract there exist not only the express promises set forth in the contract
but all such iinpliedprovisions as are necessary to effectuate the intention of the
parties, and as arise from the specific circumstances under which the contract was
made. In implying terms to a contract that is silent on the particular matter in
question, only reasonable terms should he implied. Such implied terms are as
much a part of the contract as those which are express.

Star Phoenix Min. Co. v. Hecla Min. Co., 130 Idaho 223, 231, 939 P.2d 542, 550 (1997)
(emphasis added), (quoting, Davis v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 109 Idaho 8 10, 8 1314, 712 P.2d 51 1, 514-15 (1985)). This Court has further stated that "terms are to be implied in
a contract . . . because they are necessarily involved in the contractual relationship so that the
parties must have intended them." Id. (quoting, Archer v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 102 Idaho
852, 642 P.2d 943 (1982)). Likewise, it is generally held that "[wlhere a contract fails to specify
all the duties and obligations intended to be assumed, the law will imply an agreement to do
those things that according to reason and justice the parties should do in order to carry out the

purpose for which the contract was made. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 368 (emphasis added).
In this case, the district court did nothing more than find that the option contract
contained certain implied terms "as [were] necessary to effectuate the intention of the parties,"
and "carry out the purpose for which the contract was made," consistent with Idaho law. Star

Phoenix Min. Co., 130 Idaho at 231, 939 P.2d at 550; 17A Am. Jnr. 2d Contracts § 368. The
express language of the option contract, as well as the evidence presented at trial, clearly
established that it was the parties' intent that Justad have the option to purchase the lake front
property described in the option following the death of the Gassers/Optionors.

(Plaintiff's

Ex. 3).
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L:\j\justad025389\appeaIOOOO2\pldg\brfs\RelBrief-061008-BET-BET.doc

-7-

By implying a term for a contract for deed transaction, the district court (1) took into
account the fact that the contract for sale, wherein the Gassers agreed to sell and the Justads
agreed to purchase approxiinately 113 acres of property adjoining the option property, was a
contract for deed transaction, and (2) carried out the purpose for which the option contract was
made (i.e., to give Justad the chance to purchase the option property following the death of the
Gassers). (Tr., p.125, 11.1 1-24). In finding that the option contract contained certain implied
terms, the district court did not e n so as to make the contract unenforceable, but rather merely
implied such provisions and terms as were reasonably necessary to effectuate the intention of the
parties consistent with Idaho law.

D.

Tile district court's finding that Ward received notice of Justad's intent to exercise
the option on April 11,2006, is supported by substantial and competent evidence in
the record.
In its bench ruling, the district court found as a matter of fact that Justad timely exercised

the option on April 11, 2006, fifty-one (51) days after Decedent's death. (Tr., p.112, 11.1-3);
(Tr., p.115, 11.16-17). In his Reply Brief, Ward argues that the district court's finding that the
option was exercised on April 11, 2006 was not supported by the evidence. (Ward's Reply
Brief, p.6). Specifically, Ward argues that (I) the intent to exercise an option is not sufficient to
exercise an option, and (2) that constructive notice is insufficient to exercise an option. Each
will be addressed in turn.
1.

Justad argues, and the district court found, that she exercised the option on
April 11,2006.

In his Reply Brief, Ward confuses the issue by asserting that Justad argues that she
"intended to exercise the option" at the April 11, 2006 hearing, and implies that Justad does not
RESPONDENT'S 1 CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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argue that she actually exercised the option on April 11. (Ward's Reply Brief, pp.6). This is
simply not the case and runs directly contrary to the arguments set forth by Justad throughout the
duration of this matter as well as the district court's holding below. (Justad's Respondent's /
Cross-Appellant's Brief, p.16 & p.20). More importantly, the district court expressly found that
Justad timely exercised the option on April 11,2006, fifty-one (51) days after Decedent's death.
( T 1 1 2 11-3) r . , 1 1 5 1116-17) ( R 1 3 1 ) The district court's express finding is of
significance because this Court has held that "[a] trial court's findings of fact in a court tried case
will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's
role as trier of fact." Benniger v. Der$eld, 142 Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). A
trial court's findings of fact will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a);

Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 325, 78 P.3d 389, 392 (2003). Thus, it is clear that Ward's
assertion that Justad argues that she intended to exercise the option at the April 11,2006 hearing
is clearly erroneous.
Based upon his erroneous assumption, Ward goes on to argue that district court's
decision to specifically enforce the option contract at issue here should be overturned because
Justad did not give notice of her exercise on April 11, 2006. In support of his argument, Ward
cites to a single case from the State of Wyoming, Shellhart v. Axford, 485 P.2d 1031 (Wyo.
1971), and relies upon a portion of a single sentence from that case without setting forth the facts
on which that case was decided. (Ward's Reply Brief, p.7). A review of Shellhart reveals that it
is not on point with the facts of this case, and is easily distinguishable. As a result, it does not
provide persuasive authority in this case.
In Shellhart, an optionee entered into an agreement to acquire an option to purchase
certain real property from the optionor. 485 P.2d at 1032. An express term of the option
RESPONDENT'S / CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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contract in that case was that the optionee was required to give the optionor "at least 30 days
notice in writing of [optionee's] intention to so exercise said option."

Id.

The optionee

subsequently wrote a letter to the optionor, which stated: "This letter shall constitute that notice,
however, the actual exercise of the o ~ t i o nwill not occur until sometime before December 1,
1969." Id. at 1032-33 (emphasis added). The optionee did not thereafter exercise the option.

Id. at 1033. When the optionee brought suit to specifically enforce the option contract based
upon the above-mentioned letter, the Wyoming court denied the optionee's request, stating:
The letter from plaintiff's attorney . . . referred to the option provision and stated:
'This letter shall constitute that notice, however, the actual exercise of the option
will not occur until sometime before December 1, 1969.'

...

The words quoted make it clear the option was not currently exercised because it
was stated the 'actual exercise of the option will not occur until sometime before
December 1, 1969.'

Id. at 1032-33. The court stated that the above-mentioned attempt to give notice was not the
same as giving notice. Id. at 1032.
This case is clearly distinguishable from Shellhart. In Shellhart, the terms of the option
contract at issue specifically required the optionee to give the optionor thirty (30) days notice of
his intention to exercise the option. Furthermore, in Shellhart the optionee gave the optionor
notice that he planned to exercise the option in the future, but expressly made clear that he was
not presently exercising the option.

Id. at 1032-33.

The optionee failed thereafter to

subsequently exercise the option as he stated he would, and thus the Wyoming court found that
optionee's act of informing the optioner that he was going to exercise the option in the future,
and thereafter failing to do so, did not result in an exercise of the option. Such is not the case
here. Justad gave notice of her exercise of the option to Ward on April 11, 2006. The district
court expressly found that Justad exercised the option on April 11, 2006. (Tr., p.112, 11.1-3);
RESPONDENT'S 1 CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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(Tr., 5

, 1 6 - 1 7 ) ; ( R 3 1 ) . This case does not involve a situation, such as that in

Shellhart, where the optionee stated that he was going to exercise the option in the future, and
then failed to follow up and exercise the option. As a result, Ward's reliance on the Wyoming
case is misplaced.
2.

Ward received notice of Justad's exercise of the option on April 11,2006.

In his Reply Brief, Ward argues that Constructive Notice of Justad's exercise of the
option at the April 11,2006 hearing is insufficient. (Ward's Reply Brief, p.7). Ward's argument
to this effect is unsupported by any citation to legal authority or case law. This Court has made
clear that "issues not supported by legal argument or authority will not be considered by this
Court" on appeal. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 555, 165 P.3d 261, 269
(2007). Thus, Ward's unsupported argument on the constructive notice issue should not be
addressed by the Court.
Even assuming Ward's argument on this issue is addressed, it is unavailing.

It is

generally held that where there is an absence of any provision in the option contract referring the
manner by which an option can be exercised, anything that amounts to a manifestation of the
optionee's determination to accept is sufficient. See e.g., Killam v. Tenney, 366 P.2d 739, 747
(Or. 1961) (holding that where nothing limits the way in which notice is to be exercised,
"anything that amounts to a manifestation of the optionee's determination to accept is
sufficient"); Duprey v. Donahoe, 323 P.2d 903,905 (Wash. 1958) (holding that in the absence of
any provision in the option with reference to the manner by which an option can be exercised,
any manifestation indicating an acceptance is sufficient); Steele v. Northrup, 143 N.W.2d 302,
306 (Iowa 1966) (holding that "no particular form of notice is required in the absence of a
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provision to the contrary in the instrument granting the option"). Though not controlling, this
case law is certainly persuasive.
In this case, the terms of the option contract did not specify the manner in which the
option was to be exercised following the death of the optionors. The terms of the Option
provided the following with respect to the exercise of the Option:
This Option may be exercised upon the mutual consent of all the parties to this
Agreement, in writing, or the JUSTED S [sic] may elect to exercise said Option
upon the deaths of both JOHN W. GASSER and PHYLLIS A. GASSER. Provided,
that said election shall be exercised within sixty days of the death of the last to
die, and said election shall be binding upon the Personal Representatives and
Trustees and Estates of the GASSER'S. If the election is not exercised within
said period of time, then this Option shall terminate, together with all rights
hereunder.
(emphasis added). Thus, the contract was silent with respect to the manner in which notice of
the exercise of the option should be given. As a result, anything that amounts to a manifestation
of Justad's intent to exercise the option is sufficient. See e.g., Killam, 366 P.2d at 747 (holding
that where nothing limits the way in which notice is to be exercised, "anything that amounts to a
manifestation of the optionee's determination to accept is sufficient").
The district court correctly found that Ward received notice of Justad's exercise of the
option as of April 11, 2006, given the facts presented in the record. Under this Court's holding
in Pfleuger v. Hopple, 66 Idaho 152, 157, 156 P.3d 316, 318 (1945), a party has constructive
notice of a fact when that party has actual knowledge of certain other facts from which it can be
concluded that Defendant either did in fact know, or should have known, of the fact in question.
Furthermore, under the Court's holding in Fenton v. King Hill Irr. District, 67 Idaho 456, 466,
186 P.2d 477, 482 (1947), a party is chargeable with notice of all the facts a reasonable
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investigation would have disclosed where the facts and circumstances would excite the attention
of a man of ordinary prudence.
In this case, Ward had notice of Plaintiffs intent to exercise the option as of April 1 1,
2006. It is undisputed that Ward was present at the April l I, 2006, hearing, that he knew and
recognized Justad-Hood as Justad's daughter, that he knew Justad had an option to purchase the
option property, and that he heard what said by Justad-Hood at the hearing. (Tr., p.84, 11.3-13);
(Tr., p.83, 11.6-8). As a result of Ward's attendance at the April 11 hearing, Ward either did
know or should have known that Justad intended to exercise the option given that that he knew
and recognized Justad-Hood as Justad's daughter, knew Justad had an option to purchase the
option property, and heard what said by Justad-Hood at the hearing. Given the evidence, the
district court found that Ward received notice of Justad's intent to exercise the option on April

I . . . find that in fact Ron Ward knew who Jodie was. She was [Justad's]
daughter. Knew that [Justad] had bought from and paid for an option years before
from [Decedent] and her husband, knew that Jodie came bearing [Justad's] power
of attorney, and that Jodie made that all clear to Ron Ward, the man who at the
April I 1 th, 2006, hearing, was seeking to become the personal representative and
the man who would later become the personal representative at the June 15th
hearing. It was clear on April 11, 2006, that [Justad] was giving notice to Ron
Ward, and I find as a matter of fact and law that there was no other interpretation
that Ron Ward could've come away from that hearing with, so I find that the
option was exercised, accepted on April 11,2006.
(Tr., p.115, 11.4-17); See also (Supp. R., p.33). As set forth in more detail in Justad's opening
brief, the district court's holding that Ward received notice of Justad's intent to exercise the
option on April 11, 2006, is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record, and
thus should not be overruled on appeal. (Justad's Respondent's 1 Cross Appellant's Brief,
pp. 16-22).
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E.

Justad is entitled to attorney fees below and on appeal.
The argument set forth in this section supplements the argument already set forth by

Justad in her opening brief pertaining to attomey fees below and on appeal.

(Justad's

Respondent's 1 Cross Appellant's Brief, pp.27-31). Justad is entitled to attorney fees below and
on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code

5

12-120(3). Idaho Code

5

12-120(3), compels an award

attorney fees to the prevailing party in any civil action to recover on a commercial transaction.
Commercial transaction has been defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or
household purposes." I.C.

5

12-120(3). The test for application of this statutory directive is

whether the commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit, that is, whether the
commercial transaction is integral to the ctaim and constitutes the basis upon which the party is
attempting to recover. Brower v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792
P.2d 345,349 (1990).
Justad argued in her opening brief that she is entitled to attomey fees in this matter, both
below and on appeal, because Justad's decision to enter into the option contract was made for
investment purposes. (Justad's Respondent's / Cross Appellant's Brief, pp.27-29). The grounds
on which said argument was made were based in this Court's holding in Cannon v. Perry, 144
Idaho 728, 732, 170 P.3d 393, 397 (2007), wherein this Court indicated that where a transaction
involving a piece of real property is undertaken for "investment purposes," it may be a
commercial transaction under Idaho Code 3 12-120(3).
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In this case, Justad testified she and her late husband entered into the 1978 contract of
sale to purchase the 113 acres in ~arrison,'and the 1978 option contract at issue here, for certain
adjoining lake front property for investment purposes; namely, so that her son could develop it:
Q.

Tell me a little about that purchase. Why did you purchase property From
the Gassers?

A.

Well, they had decided to get out of the cattle business and they didn't
need that property, and, uh, so they were retirement age and so they said
that, uh -we asked if we could have an option on the rest of the property,
he was thinking about the upper property, hundred and thirteen acres I
think it was, and, uh, so we said that, well, when, we - if we purchase it
we'd like to have an option on the rest of it because we're gonna leave that
part - all the property up here we were gonna leave to my son who since
was killed, and - so that they could develop it, he could develop it when
the time was right.

(Tr., p.23, 11.3-16).

In Cannon, this Court looked to the intention of two appealing parties

-

Hinrichs and Moreno - at the time they entered into a written agreement for the purchase of
certain real property to determine if they purchased the property for investment purposes. 144
Idaho at 732, 170 P.3d at 397. The two appealing parties argued that the transaction was made
for residential purposes; however, this Court found that because the two appealing parties
testified that they entered into the agreement to purchase for "investment purposes" the same was
a commercial transaction under Idaho Code 5 12-120(3). Because Justad's decision to enter into
the option contract was made for investment purposes, she is entitled to attorney's fees pursuant
to Idaho Code 5 12-120(3).

'

On May 8, 1978, Justad and her husband R.W. Justad entered into two written agreements with Justad's sister
Phyllis Gasser (hereinaffer "Decedent") and her husband John Gasser.' (Justad Aff., R., p.75). The first was a
contract of sale, wherein the Gassers agreed to sell and the Justads agreed to purchase approximately 113 acres of
real property located in Harrison, Idaho, more particularly described in Plaintiffs Exhibit 2. (Justad Aff., R., p.75);
(Tr., pp.23-26). The contract of sale is not at issue in this case. The second was an option contract, wherein the
Justads acquired an option to purchase certain lake front property located in Harrison from the Gassers, more
particularly described in Plaintiffs Exhibit 3. (Justad Aff., R., p.75); (Tr., pp.26-30).
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111.

CONCLUSION

Justad respectfiilly requests that this Court affirm the district court's decision to
specifically enforce the option contract. In addition, Justad respectfully requests that this Court
overrule the district court's decision to deny Justad's request for attorney's fees below. Last,
Justad respectfully requests that this Court grant her request for attorney's fees and costs on
appeal.
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